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1962/11/03

~Return RG~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY
G/PM

~TOP SECRET~ ~EYES ONLY~

29

November 3, 1962

MEMORANDUM

TO: G   - Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

FROM: G/PM - Raymond L. Garthoff *Ray*

SUBJECT: Interpretation of Respective Commitments

    I understand from Roger Hilsman that you are now drafting an analysis of the specific commitments which the US and the USSR have assumed with respect to the settlement of the Cuban missile affair. I am, therefore, taking the liberty of asking that this note be passed into you. I am aware that Ed Martin believes strongly that we should make no additional commitment beyond the President's statement of October 27. Nonetheless, I believe we should bear in mind that Khrushchev in his message of October 28 has given a broader interpretation to the President's statement than was intended or is acceptable; for the US to leave the matter unclarified in public statements would tend to confirm Khrushchev's broader interpretation. I think it would be preferable to have either a US or an OAS statement undertaking to reaffirm the obligations assumed in the Charter of the UN and the Charter of the OAS not to have recourse to the use of force in international relations except in the case of individual or collective self defense or in accordance with existing treaties. This would permit full freedom of action in dealing with any situation in which we chose to conclude that Castro was engaged in direct or indirect aggression against any part of the Western Hemisphere. This could be made clear without being made so explicit as to tie our hands in the future.

    Attached are the INR file copies of their analyses of Khrushchev's message of the 28 and the unofficial discussion in Washington.